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At independence, African countries adopted various development strategies. 
Unable to generate the desired development, African countries embraced 
regional and economic integration as the alternative approach and adopted 
the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. Due to its inherent contradictions and 
Western opposition it was abandoned. In 2001, Afrocrats crafted the New 
Partnership for African Development in tune with the predominant neo-
liberal ideology. This discourse critically compares the Lagos Plan and 
NEPAD. It argues that the adoption of NEPAD is revisionist, an 
abandonment of the Lagos Plan crafted in the womb of the dependency 
paradigm for the prescriptions of the initially rejected Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ sponsored Berg Report wrapped in the garment of the 
modernization ideology. The discourse concludes that in the NEPAD 
framework exist fundamental contradictions similar to those that frustrated 
the Lagos Plan.       
Introduction 
The decades of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed so much theorizing about the 
causes of African countries’ underdevelopment and the possibilities for 
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development. While proposed alternative development strategies provided 
some form of initial direction for research, by the mid-1970s they became 
profoundly inadequate to explain Africa’s continued underdevelopment or 
create a pathway for her development (Rodney, 1972; Ake, 1980; Asante, 
1991: xiii). African leaders considered the option of a collective action for 
the continent. Consequently, the collaborative work of the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
produced the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) 
with its concept of collective self-reliance and self-sustainment. Though with 
huge and flamboyant promises, the LPA, like other strategies, failed to 
achieve development for Africa. In its place is the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 with concomitant grandeur 
acceptance and international support. 
There has been an intensification of the debate over the appropriate future 
development strategy for Africa (Naanen, 1985; Shaw, 1986; Ravenhill, 
1986; Asante, 1991; Gambari, 2004; Ukeje, 2005). As observed by Adedeji 
(2002: 3-6), every attempt by Africans to forge their future and craft their 
own indigenous development strategies and policies has been pooh-poohed 
by the international financial institutions (IFIs) with the support, or at least 
the connivance, of the donor community. The received neo-classical 
development paradigm was inappropriate warranting the earnest search for an 
African development paradigm that was not imitative of the dominant 
economics of the industrialised market economies. Between 1980 and 2001, 
African leaders have crafted six landmark strategies, viz:  
i. The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 
1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos (1980) 
ii. Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990, 
(APPER), which was later converted into the United Nations 
Programme for Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and 
Development (UN-PAAERD) (1986) 
iii. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation 
(AAF-SAP) (1989) 
iv. The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development 
(1990) 
v. The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in 
the 1990s (UN-NADAF) (1991) 
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vi. The New Partnership for African Development (2001). 
Given Africa’s excessive dependence on the West, their narrow political base 
and their perennial failure to show commitment to national and continental 
development agenda, the implementation of development plans has suffered 
from benign neglect by African leaders and opposition by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Lacking the resources and will to carry on self-reliantly, they 
abandoned their own strategies for the implementation of exogenous agenda, 
which firmly tied the African canoe to the North’s neo-liberal ship on the 
waters of globalization (Adedeji, 2002: 4).          
The Lagos Plan Revisited 
Very few Africans today would remember the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 
the culmination of a four-year long effort, initiated and led by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA), to undertake an 
agonising review of Africa’s development strategies since the 1960s. By 
trying to march towards its future hand-in-hand with its colonial, mono-
cultural, low-productivity and excessively dependent and open economy, 
Africa has ensured no dignified future for itself. In 1976, the ECA produced 
the Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New 
International Order in Africa, the intellectual and theoretical foundation 
upon which the Monrovia Strategy (1979) and the Lagos Plan of Action and 
the Final Act of Lagos (1980) were built (Shaw, 1986: 114; Asante, 1991: 59; 
Adedeji, 2002: 6).   
The Revised Framework prescribed that any credible development strategy 
for Africa must encapsulate the principles of self-reliance, self-sustainment, 
the democratisation of the development process and a fair and just 
distribution of the fruit of development through the progressive eradication of 
unemployment and mass poverty. African leaders observed that the 
continued incorporation of the continent into the orbit of the world capitalist 
system and the rationalization of its excessive external orientation has 
profoundly rendered the African economies extremely open while exposing 
them to the vicissitudes of the unfriendly international economic changes that 
intensify their vulnerability to external shocks and dislocations. 
While advocating a radical delinking approach from the draconian capitalist 
system and a complete break with the old externally-oriented theories of 
development (Anikpo, 1987: 9), the Lagos Plan emphasized the domestic 
natural resource base for determining profiles of development and economic 
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growth, for designing and implementing appropriate strategies for manpower 
development, industrialization and the promotion of domestic production of 
goods and services based on intra- and inter-sectoral linkages, and the 
expansion of national and regional markets (Naanen, 1985: 44-5; Asante, 
1991: 45).  
The Plan reveals African leaders’ recognition of the need to coordinate 
economic policies and actions at various supranational levels to optimize the 
use of resources and to benefit from economies of scale (Naanen, 1985:43-4; 
Asante, 1991: 60). The Plan denunciated the transplanting of conventional 
development paradigms in Africa, and emphasizes the role of the public 
sector as the pivot of development. Explicitly, as far as imperialism is 
concerned, self-reliance threatens the fundamental law of capitalist 
development. 
Consequently, no sooner the Lagos Plan was adopted on 29th April, 1980 by 
the Organization of African Unity Heads of State and Government Summit 
than the World Bank presented a draft of the popular Berg Report entitled 
“Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action” to 
the OAU leadership in 1981. The Berg Report epitomizes the subtle form of 
opposition to and the violation of Africa’s right to self-reliant development 
and represented the official mind of the industrial states. Its opposition to the 
Plan is so subtle that it may be lost in the sophisticated academic garb that 
conceals its human rights violation and demonstrated the superiority complex 
that characterized Euro-African relations (Naanen, 1985: 44; Anikpo, 1987: 
10). 
Like the modernization paradigm that propagated its fruition, the Berg Report 
sees Africa’s problems as being caused almost entirely by internal structural 
constraints. While the Report advocated the elimination of protectionist 
measures (liberalization) for efficiency, the Plan emphasizes 
industrialization, agricultural development and protection of local industries; 
while the Report recommended the reduction of the size of the public sector, 
the Plan argued that manpower was in short supply in every sector and 
recommended the intensification of training and manpower development 
(Naanen, 1985: 45). However, the plan was idealistic and smacks of a 
political document conceived at a diplomatic cocktail of chiefs of 
government than a realistic grass-root economic programme, which fails to 
elaborate, in fine technical detail, how the various goals could be 
accomplished. The Plan fails to specify practical policy measures that would 
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have made realistic contribution towards the attainment of its long-term 
objectives (Naanen, 1985: 45; Asante, 1991: 61). 
The Plan lacks realistic appraisal of potential costs and possible sources of 
finance so that the implications for a self-reliant strategy were not  
considered; rather than representing a plan of action, a blue-print for Africa’s 
development, the Plan resembles a mammoth shopping list with no ranking 
of desired objectives. Considering the relative state of underdevelopment of 
Africa, the constraints of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme, and the contemporary international division of labour, the 
feasibility of several short-to-medium term projects to be implemented within 
the twenty-year period from 1980-2000 became problematic (Naanen, 1985: 
45-6). Specifically, there was no explicit mobilization call for economic 
nationalism vis-a-vis its delinking thrust (Asante, 1991: 61). 
The Plan did not address the issue of popular participation and human rights, 
which are so critical to development, and did not also raise questions about 
inequalities in the distribution of incomes and services. Although the Plan 
belatedly recognized the issue of women in development, it was silent on 
class distinctions. The Plan failed to admit the need for a dramatic policy 
change and committed itself to an essential continuation of the status quo in 
terms of policies and priorities (Ravenhill, 1986: 3-4; Asante, 1991: 62). 
Therefore, the Plan could not achieve the establishment of an African 
Economic Community by 2000. Worst still, African countries could not 
restructure and transform their social and economic structures and policies to 
create the conditions for the realization of self-reliant and self-sustaining 
development (Asante, 1991: 63). 
One fundamental contradiction, between objectives and means, was the issue 
of foreign aid or international assistance for the implementation of a 
development strategy that seeks to delink from the world-capitalist system. 
Its challenge to the economic interests of the industrial capitalist countries 
was central. Yet it was from these dominant powers who find self-reliance so 
offensive that the Plan sought cooperation for its implementation. The 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) through the International 
Development Assistance (IDA), a lending affiliate of the World Bank, which 
produced the Berg Report, was expected to provide a part of the huge fund 
required. The prerequisite technology needed for the implementation was 
expected to come from the industrial North (Lagos Plan, 1980: 14-15). 
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It becomes paradoxical for external resources to finance a self-reliant 
development strategy making the Plan a part of an unfulfilled promise of 
global development strategies. Explicitly, the Plan diverted the attention of 
African governments away from the need for radical domestic economic 
reforms. Though self-reliance did not preclude Africa from international 
intercourse, from accepting foreign aid, from absorbing useful foreign 
experience, or from making maximum use of exploitable external factors, 
relying mainly on the African efforts than the external conditions can be fully 
utilized to further strengthen their self-reliant capabilities. Consequently, the 
internal and external contradictions in the Plan document ambushed its 
successful implementation. The funeral obsequies of the Plan was read when 
the external financing needed for its implementation did not come and 
African governments could not restructure the social and economic structures 
of African states. 
The NEPAD Alternative 
The most recent alternative strategy is the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) adopted in 2001. New is the extent of African 
ownership of the development agenda anchored on the recognition that 
African countries have the primary responsibility for improving economic 
and social conditions in the continent; new is the wide acceptance of the role 
of good governance in fostering growth and reducing poverty; and, new is the 
extent of international appreciation and support for NEPAD (Funke and 
Nsouli, 2003: 3). 
NEPAD resulted ultimately from a merger of the Millennium Partnership for 
the African Recovery Programme (MAP) initiated by Presidents Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, and the Omega Plan put 
forward by President Abdoulaye Wade. The merger culminated in the New 
African Initiative (NAI) approved by the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) Summit of Heads of State and Government and endorsed by the 
Group of Eight (G-8) countries in July 2001. The Heads of State 
Implementation Committee (HSIC) finalized the policy framework in 
October 2001 and renamed NAI as NEPAD. NEPAD is a commitment to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and a Programme of Action for 
achieving sustainable development in the 21st century (NEPAD, 2001; AU, 
2002; www.nepad.com). 
Contrary to Herbert’s (2002) interpretation that NEPAD represent some kind 
of a “Marshall Plan for Africa”, to Funke and Nsouli (2003), NEPAD is not a 
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Marshall Plan because it is not foreign-led but an African-owned initiative; it 
is not reconstructing what had existed previously. According to Adedeji 
(2002: 9), “unlike NEPAD, which has been initiated and prepared by the 
African countries, the Marshall Plan was a joint endeavour of the war-
devastated European countries (the recipients) and the United States (the 
donor) for a period of four to five years” to facilitate the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of Europe after World War II.   
While Kanbur (2001) presented NEPAD as a regional institution, which 
typically focuses on narrowly defined goals and initiatives, dedicates 
resources, and has some mechanisms to enforce contracts, Funke and Nsouli 
(2003: 11) and Ukeje (2005: 10) observe that NEPAD is very broad-based, 
comprehensive, and has little enforcement power; NEPAD is not a blueprint 
for African development because implementation details are still being 
developed and will ultimately be formulated largely in the context of the 
national development strategies of individual African countries; that though 
poverty reduction is an overarching objective in the framework document, it 
is listed under the human resource development initiative; that NEPAD is “to 
develop Africa into a net exporter of agricultural products”, as an objective 
and not a goal in itself.      
While NEPAD must be understood in the context of the demands of 
globalization, it is possible to contemplate just how NEPAD may turn out to 
be another hoax in Africa’s search for an appropriate development paradigm. 
Given the character of globalization, particularly what the phenomenon is 
doing to Africa, the way the NEPAD initiative is conceived and currently 
implemented may not serve Africa’s development problems well now or into 
the future. The initiative must have to contend with a variety of concomitant 
challenges relating to its underlying raison d’etre and its operational 
(domestic and external) environments within which it is expected to carry out 
its mandates. Meeting its priorities would depend so much on how NEPAD is 
able to engage with the new security problems (Ukeje, 2005: 10). 
The end of the cold war heralded a shift from geo-politics to globalisation 
and ushered in a renewed interest in governance issues pertaining to 
democracy and reforms. However, as Cawthra (2004: 30-31) has argued, 
these multi-faceted governance issues are mostly donor-driven with limited 
local content and sense of ownership. The capacity of African states under 
the framework of NEPAD to grapple with and respond to pressing social 
issues touching on the welfare and survival of the vast majority of the 
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African population would define the quality of human, social and national 
development in the near future (Ukeje, 2005: 14). 
NEPAD acknowledges good governance as a basic requirement for peace, 
security and sustainable political and socio-economic development, and 
broad participation of all sectors of the society. It anchors Africa’s 
development on its own resources and resourcefulness of its people; in 
creating partnerships between and among African peoples; accelerating 
regional and continental integration, building the competitiveness of African 
countries; forging a new international partnership that will change the 
unequal relationship between Africa and the developed countries (Ukeje, 
2005: 16; NEPAD Document, para. 20: pp.7-8; Thisday, Tuesday, July 9, 
2002: 30; Gberevbie, 2004: 224; West Africa, July 15-21, 2002: 10; 
Gambari, 2004: 6). 
However, NEPAD’s obsession with neo-liberalism and its deepening 
integration of African vulnerable economies into the asymmetrically unjust 
global trading system without a concomitant restructuring of the African 
political economy becomes the first fault-line. Neo-liberalism can only 
accentuate the already deep-seated crises facing the African continent as it 
draws more and more people into the loop of poverty rather than alleviate it. 
It will sacrifice the human rights of the African peoples to the whims and 
caprices of a volatile and untrustworthy global capital while offering the 
West a renewed opportunity to accelerate the exploitation of Africa. NEPAD 
offers no insight about how the unfair global trade regime would structurally 
redefine changes to favour Africa (Mbaku, 2004: 394-6; Matthews, 2004: 
503; Ukeje, 2005: 18). 
A significant sinister ambiguity that exists in the NEPAD framework is the 
nature of the partnership envisaged between Africa and the developed 
economies since it claims a development rhetoric that retains the political and 
economic governance processes in the West as a convenient model for 
Africa. Explicitly, the operators of NEPAD could not find any alternative 
paths to the Western model. NEPAD is still being manipulated by its 
development partners (Matthews, 2004: 497-500). Therefore, the Western 
actors have achieved in NEPAD what they could not achieve in the Berg 
Report.  
It is this kind of partnership that drives the Poverty Reduction Strategic 
Papers (PRSP) implemented since 1999 by the World Bank and the 
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International Monetary Fund after the colossal failure of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme of the 1980s (Hope, 2002: 400). Abrahamsen (2004: 
1454) refers to NEPAD as a “Western wolf in an African sheepskin” to 
underscore the continent’s persistence subservience to Western power and 
values. Rhetoric and reality are not the same, while Africa is claiming 
ownership of NEPAD, the West continues to see it as a donor-recipient 
relationship (Adedeji, 2002: 11). 
The peculiar types of partnership under NEPAD are a little more than 
conditionality by another name: a form of advanced liberal rule that 
increasingly govern through the explicit commitment to the agency of the 
recipient states. This partnership, though not working primarily as direct 
domination and imposition, promises of incorporation and inclusion in the 
neo-liberal rubrics of the international system. The illusion about 
partnerships manifests concurrently by the fact that through contemporary 
donor practices, certain sections of the African elite and bureaucracy come to 
internalize the neo-liberal values of governance and even develop toolkits not 
radically different from those developed in the West (Ukeje, 2005: 10). The 
Monterrey UN Conference on Financing for Development had warned that 
there are no radical changes in policy and attitude in the offing (Adedeji, 
2002: 11). 
To Adedeji (2002: 12), while co-operation is no longer adequate, compact is 
too strong because it implies making binding commitments. The concept of 
partnership conveys a relationship stronger than cooperation but weaker than 
a compact. It involves joint effort, joint responsibility but does not always 
result in binding commitments. Interdependence no doubt captures the 
essence of partnership and international cooperation. However, as long as the 
developed countries will maintain their economic progress along the lines of 
contemporary international division of labour, the relations between the 
North and the South will continue to be characterised by a domination of the 
West over Africa, as was the case between the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the African Caribbean Pacific Association (ACP) 
under the Lome Conventions.   
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as mutually agreed and 
voluntary instrument for self-monitoring ensures that policies and practices 
of participating states conform to the agreed values, codes and standards 
contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and 
Corporate Governance. Chabal (2002: 462) informs that NEPAD is a 
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commitment on the current (but not so new) elites in Africa to the present 
democratic orthodoxy in order to guarantee a transfer of resources to Africa: 
a continuation with, rather than a break from, the type of relations that has 
guided the continent’s engagement with the international community since 
independence. If the standards of the donors will be imposed on Africa 
without which aid will be withheld, then where is the claim to African 
ownership of NEPAD? 
The affection and obedience of NEPAD to the central tenets of neo-
liberalism raises questions as to its foundation for a new optimism about 
Africa’s future (Olukoshi, 2003: 20-7). The high hopes generated by the 
NEPAD document would be seriously undermined by the essentially neo-
liberal pitch of its economic objectives and the limited scope of its political 
agenda, which is cast in the governance managerialism. NEPAD did not 
realize that Africa’s problem did not derive so much from the marginalization 
of Africa but from the problematic manner in which it was integrated into the 
contemporary capitalist world system. When an African country’s or group 
of countries’ performance is adjudged unsatisfactory a cloud hangs over the 
entire Africa and will be collectively vilified. More so, the chronic tendencies 
of ‘the begging bowl and broken promises’ existed in the Lagos Plan and 
NEPAD, and traditionally ambushed the latest strategy (Gambari, 2004: 9). 
At present, what is given as aid to Africa tends to be cancelled out by 
subsidies to industrialized countries’ agricultural farmers. 
The LPA and NEPAD: What a Future for Africa? 
Contrary to the claim of the Lagos Plan and NEPAD as indigenous 
development strategies that all stakeholders share in their ownership, they are 
top-down rather than bottom-up initiatives. The political leaders were unable 
to carry the people, the stakeholders of Africa’s development, along with 
them. No public discourse was held in majority of African countries, national 
parliaments were not constructively engaged, yet both claim the promotion of 
democratic principles and instituting popular participation and good 
governance. The African ownership they claim is no more than ownership of 
the Heads of Governments and their immediate advisers. Melber (2004: 1, 7) 
qualifies NEPAD as a “pact among elites”, which seek to gain the power of 
definition over Africa’s future development discourse. Like previous top-
down policy formulations, NEPAD reeks of technicism, a scent which could 
dissipitate if exposed to the fires of popular debate, protest and participation. 
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Furthermore, no one can expect monopoly capitalism to commit suicide. In 
1981, the US refused to pay its share of the IDA fund for the period of 1981-
83 thereby reducing IDA’s commitment authority by more than $500 million 
and refused to rally other donor countries to the plight of LDC. As Adedeji 
(2002: 11) observes, “even the US $50 billion per year, as the additional 
resources required for achieving the 2015 Millennium goals world-wide, is a 
non-binding and best endeavour commitment”. Meanwhile, the environment 
of falling official development assistance (ODA) is projected to persist and 
even fall further in the foreseeable future. Yet Africa alone is hoping under 
NEPAD to attract $64.0 billion every year. Therefore, the creditor nations 
would continue to keep the debtor countries on a short leash with the powers 
of the Paris and London Clubs of creditor nations remaining intact.  
The G8 interests and those of the NEPAD architects would be served to 
reflect the prescription of the Berg Report via the modernisation paradigm 
and neo-liberalism. To Funke and Nsouli (2003: 23), the availability of 
adequate resources, particularly of external financing, will put a natural limit 
on the speed of implementation. The willingness of the international 
community to actively contribute to NEPAD will to a large extent depend on 
Africa’s ability to cope with the challenges of an unfriendly international 
neo-liberal economy. Though potentially a forceful mechanism, short-term 
improvements as a result of the APRM, are less likely. In the meantime, it 
remains in the hands of each country’s leadership to improve the economic 
and governance environment, using as a basis the internationally accepted 
guidelines and codes of good practices. To make action plans more credible 
and verifiable, detailed time-tables must be set up. 
Melber (2004: 12) clearly demonstrated that NEPAD will not be able to 
replace demands for a fair share in the world’s resources by the victims of 
domination and exploitation. At best, it will facilitate an increase in the share 
of the African clients and stakeholders from the global cake. Instead of a 
meaningful radical alternative, NEPAD is closer to capitalism as a new form 
of apartheid. Taylor (2003: 312) reminds us of the active role elites in the 
South have played in the recent process of capitalist expansion misleadingly 
termed globalisation by supporting the new Washington Consensus, resulting 
in the promotion of the liberalisation of trade and capital movements. It 
remains to be seen if there is any pragmatism in the argument: better this 
capitalism than no capitalism at all. Even still, in this age of industrialisation 
when African value in the international market is less than 2%, under its 
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market access initiative, NEPAD insisted “to develop Africa into a net 
exporter of agricultural products” without a concomitant industrial drive 
(NEPAD, 2001: 40).  
Relatively affluent African countries whose ruling classes benefit from close 
association with Western capitalists would find it harder to delink from 
monopoly capitalism than poor countries (Brown and Cummings, 1984: 124). 
As Naanen (1984: 23) notes, Africa’s very position of dependency militates 
against efforts to break it. African countries could not restructure and 
transform their social and economic structures. The prevailing structure of 
politics within African states would not be conducive for the successful 
pursuits of NEPAD objectives; the interests and orientations of the African 
ruling classes are antithetical to social transformations.  
While Chabal (2002: 448) sees “very little reason to believe that the nature of 
politics in Africa will change simply because of the (admittedly admirable) 
ambition displayed by NEPAD”, Olukoshi (2005: 14) observes that NEPAD 
“seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to or 
representing the concerns of the domestic socio-political forces”. The search 
for new paradigms for African development must have as its focal point on 
mechanisms for unleashing the resources, creativity and talent of the peoples 
and communities all over Africa (Ukeje, 2005). 
Conclusion 
If the determination of Afrocrats to for Africa’s development at the dawn of 
the 21st century must succeed, then structural transformation and socio-
economic diversification must not elude Africa. In conclusion, we re-affirm 
Adedeji’s (1991: 49) position, inter alia, that: 
New African transformation ethic based on a human-
centred development paradigm which puts the people 
at the centre of the development process, on the 
driving seat as it were and is predicated, above all, on 
the rational proposition that development has to be 
engineered and sustained by the people themselves 
through their full and active participation. In other 
words, the new African transformation ethic rests on 
the firm belief that development should not be 
undertaken on behalf of a people; rather,that it should 
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be the organic outcome of a society’s value system, 
its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavours. 
African-oriented development paradigm or strategy should not be a top-down 
initiative but bottom-up to enable every stratum of the society participate in 
its evolution.           
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